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CASE COMMENTS
CRIMINAL

LAV-PLEA

OF FORMER

JEOPARDY

HELD VALID,

WHERE

FIRST INDICTMENT, WJTJCH 'WAS QUASHED, WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
CoNvicoN.-Appellants were convicted for uttering a forged check.
The indictment charged them jointly with knowingly, willingly and unlawfully giving to one W. a forged check. The indictment also read
that the check was given on the First National Bank of Somerset. At
the trial it was proved that the check was not on the First National
Bank of Somerset but was drawn on the First National Bank at Burnside. At the conclusion of the testimony the defendants' attorney
moved the court to peremptorily instruct the jury to find the defendants
not guilty on account of the insufficiency of the indictment. Thereupon
the Commonwealth's attorney moved the court to quash the indictment
and refer the prosecution to the present grand jury and the defendants
were held under the same bond awaiting the action of the grand jury.
At that time the grand jury returned a second indictment against the
same defendants on the same charge.
The latter indictment was substantially the same as the first one,
except that in all of its parts it named the First National Bank of Burnside as being tho bank upon which the check was drawn. A plea of
former jeopardy was entered at the latter trial, but the trial court
disregarded it and the defendants were convicted. Held, that this was
error as the defendants were put 6n trial on a valid indictment in the
first trial of the case and their plea of former jeopardy should have
been sustained in the last trial. Wilson and Tucker v. Commonwealth,
212 Ky. 584, 279 S. W. 988..
There is very little record of the first trial of this case to be found.
No order was entered indicating the disposition of the conflicting motions made at the conclusion of the evidence. The verdict of the jury
finding the defendants "not guilty" was written at the bottom of the
indictment and signed by one of the jurors. This shows that the peremptory instruction was sustained, but it is not established by any
court record that there was no effort to have a nunc pro tunc order
entered in conformity to the verdict. The court on reviewing the procedure found that the same general charges were made in each indictment and the same evidence was introduced in both trials. If the first
indictment was sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction,
jeopardy attached when the first jury was sworn in. This Is sufficient
to release the defendants and is as effective as a directed verdict. The
exact order made by the court is immaterial.
In the case of Williams v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 94, which has
virtually the same facts as the case at hand, the counsel for the defendant rested his case wholly upon the 14th section of Article 13 of
our Constitution which reads, "No person shall, for the same offense, be
twice put in jeopardy of his life or limb." When this clause was adopted
it is manifest that the framers of our Constitution had in mind the
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famous maxim of the common law. "Nemo bis punitur pro eadem
deicto"-"No one can be twice punished for the same crime or misdemeanor," and intended to embrace their spirit and essence in the expression used.
As to the meaning of legal jeopardy, Mr. Cooley, in his work on
Constitutional Limitations, page 327, says, "A person is in legal jeopardy when he is put on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon indictment or information which is sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and a jury has been charged with his
deliverance and a jury is said to be then charged when they have been
impaneled and sworn." Bishop on Criminal Law, section 1013, 1014.
The weight of authority is in support of this rule and it is clear
that the court, in the case at hand, gave it a literal construction. Any
other construction would be at variance with every sense of justice.
M. W. M.
DowER-W Iow is ENTITLED TO ASSIGNMENT As Do R or THnIRD OF
VALUEorF LAND, DEraIN By EvERY USE FOR WHIcH ADAPTED, INcLUDING THE PRODUCTION

oi" Oxn-The husband died intestate leaving a

widow and twelve children as his heirs at law, to whom there passed
a farm of one hundred and fifteen acres. After the death of the husband, the widow and the remaindermen joined in the execution of oil
leases on this land, and oil was found upon it in paying quantities and
royalty was paid, and is being paid, to the remaindermen upon the oil
that has been pumped from it. The widow asked for a share in the
royalty. The only parties who contested her claim were the appellees,
who owned a portion of the royalties paid on a part of the remainder.
The court held she was entitled to share in the royalties. Lemaster v.
Hudson, et al., 214 Ky. 467, 283 S. W. 439.
Kentucky Statutes, section 2132, expressly provides after the death.
of either the husband or wife, the survivor shall have an estate for his
or her life in one-third of all the real estate, of which he or she, or any
one for his or her use, was seized of an estate in fee simple during the
coverture, unless the right of such dower or interest shall have been
barred, forfeited or relinquished. Also in section 2138 she is entitled
to the house and curtilage, and to one-third of the rents, issues and
profits of this land until dower is assigned her. In the principal case
dower had never been assigned.
At common law there could be no dower in unopened mines or
quarries on the husband's land, even if such lands had been assigned to
the widow as her dower. However, this has been subjected to qualillcations in some jurisdictions. Stoughton v. Leigh, I Taunt. 402;
Coates v. Cheever, I Cow. 474
Seager v. McCabe, 92 Mich. 186, 52 N. W. 299; Willford v. Heinhoffer, 25 Ohio Cir. Ct. 747, have held that the widow is entitled to the
oil produced from land, generally assigned and confirmed to her as
dower, although the wells are sunk and the oil produced after bhe
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husband's death. Barnes v. Keys, 36 Okla. 6, 127 Pac. 261, 45 L. R. A.
(New Series) 178; Wilson v. Youst, 28 S. . 781, 39 L. R. A. (New
Series) 2U2; Ammous v. Ammous, 40 S. E. 490, are in support.
No dower having been assigned to the widow in this case, she is
entitled to have assigned to her one-third of the value of the land and
not one-third of its extent. That value could not be estimated by the
use of the surface alone, but for whatever use the land is adapted. Had
the widow not joined in the lease with the remaindemen and had she
leased the property for oil it would be waste; but where the widow and
the remaindermen together join in certain oil leases, then both the
widow and the remaindermen are entitled to share in the royalties.
Eakins v. Hawkins-, 52 W. Va. 124, 43 S. . 211; Strawn, etc. v. Brady,
etc., 84 Okla 66, 202 Pac. 505.
S. G. C.
INDEMNITY-RAIRAD HELD NOT IN PARi DEImcTo WITH TELEPHONE

COMPANY OWNING SAGGING CABu.:s RESULTING IN INJUIY TO EMPLOYEF,
AND HENCE RECOVERY MIGHT BE HAD.-The defendant telephone company

maintained wires enclosed in a cable which extended across the plaintiff railway company's tracks. One end of the cable became loose, and
sagged almost to the top of the railroad cars. An employee of the railroad company was knocked from the top of a passing box car by this
cable and injured. He recovered judgment against the railroad company
for his injuries. This action was instituted by the railroad company
to recover from the telephone company the amount of the judgment.
The telephone company pleaded that the injury was the result of the
joint negligence of the two companies, for which the railroad company
could not recover. Held, this case does not measure up to the general
rule forbidding recovery over between wrongdoers because they do not
appear to have been in pa1-i delicto. Middlesboro Telephone Co. v.
Louisville d Nashville R. R. Co., 214 Ky. 822, 284 S. W. 104.
A clear statement of the general rule of recovery over, showing
what constitutes in Pari deiicto, is made in the case of Chicago v.
Robbins, 2 Black (U. S.) 418, 17 L. Ed. 298, as follows: "Where two or
more parties, legally held to have acted in concert, commit a negligent
or other wrongful act from which damages" result to a third person,
they may be said to be in pari delicto, and the party compelled to pay
for the injury can have no action for indemnity against the other party
to the act." This principle Is followed by the Kentucky court In
Georgetown v. Cantril7, 158 Ky. 378, 164 S. W. 929. But to render this
rule applicable there must be a joint participation in the tort and the
parties must be guilty in equal degrees, according to the holding in
Oliver v. Huckins (Tex. Civ. App.), 244 S. W. 625; Baltimore, etc. R.
B. Co. v. Howard County, 113 Md. 404, 77 A. 930. The present decision
is further strengthened by the ruling in the latter case, "that actual
knowledge and failure of duty of one of the parties are not sufficient
to invoke the rule."
The general rule, where parties in pari delicto commit a negligent
or other wrongful act from which damages result to a third person,
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the party compelled to pay for the injury can have no action for indemnity against the other party to the act, has its foundation in public
policy, that no one can claim an advantage for his own wrong. The
Kentucky courts follow the weight of authority, which is in line with
the. United States Suprene Court decision, that where a case does not
measure up to the principle of in par delicto, indemnity can be had
against the party whose negligence caused the injury. Washington
Gas d Light Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U. S. 316, 40 L. Ed. 712;
Pu~lman Co. v. Cincinnati, etc., By. Co., 147 Ky. 498, 144 S. W. 385. In
the latter case the Pullman company built for the railroad company a
car with a defective brakestaff and painted over the defect. A brakeman of the railroad company was injured by reason of the defective
brakestaff and the failure of the railroad company to inspect the car
after it received it. The brakeman recovered from the railroad company. The court held that the railroad company could recover from
the Pullman company the amount recovered by the brakeman. Thus,
it is evident that the principal case is representative of the Kentucky,
the majority, and the, Supreme Court view on the subject of recovery
E. C. M.
over between parties not in pari delicto.
MXNES AND MINERALS-OWNER OF PART OF O1L AND GAS LEASE HEL
ENTITLED TO DAMAGES FROM OWNER OF ANOTHER

PART ON

ADJOINING

TO PLUG ABANDONED WELS CAUSED WATR TO
LAND, WHOSE FAiLnu
GET INTO PLAINTIFF'S 0IL.-C. owned an oil lease adjoining the lease of
X. X. abandoned two wells near the dividing line between C. and X.
Previous to this abandonment C. had had no trouble with water in his
wells, but soon afterwards discovered that water had gotten into his
wells. C., upon finding the wells abandoned by X. to be full of water
and open, gave notice to M. that the wells should be plugged as prescribed by law, and X. agreed to plug the wells at once. The wells remained open for more than a month afterwards. C.'s wells were injured by reason of water entering them by way of X.'s abandoned wells.
Section 3914a, Kentucky Statutes, prescribes the manner in which
abandoned wells shall be plugged, and penalizes a failure to comply
therewith. Section 3914, Kentucky Statutes, gives adjoining owner
right to enter and plug such abandoned wells at the cost of offending
owner. X. contended that this statutory, remedy was exclusive, and
precluded any other action for failure to comply therewith. Held, that
C. was entitled to damages for injury to his wells. Palmer Corporation
v. Collins, 214 Ky. 838, 284 S. W. 95.
In the case of R. M. Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co., 72 W. Va.
711, 99 S. E. 647, 48 L. R. A (N. S.) 167, the court had before it the
same questions of law which the principal case presents, and held that
there was a common law right of recovery for the wrongful failure of
the defendant to plug abandoned wells. There being no cases directly
In point, the court was compelled to resort to general legal principles
and the analogies of the law. An owner who so utes his property as
to injure the property of another, when by the exercise of care and the
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abstention from negligence, such injury might have been avoided, subjects himself to a common law action. City of Covington v. Geylor, 93
Ky. 275, 12 Ky. L. R. 466, 19 S. W. 741; Shrieve v. Stokes, 47 Ky. (8 B.
Mon.) 453, 48 Am. Dec. 401.
The court, in the case of R. M. Atkinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Go.,
supra, pointed out as analogous to the present question the rule that
one may not poison or pollute percolating waters so as to injure or
destroy springs supplied therefrom on adjacent lands. Gilmore V.
Royal Salt Co., 84 Kan. 729, 115 Pac. 541, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 48; Therman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 5 Allen 213; Collins v. Charities Valley Gas Co., 131 Pa. 143, 18 Atl. 1012, 6 L. R. A. 280; Kinnaird v. Stand-.
ard Oil Co., 89 Ky. 468, 12 S. W. 937, 7 L. R. A. 451. In the case of
Collins v. ChartiersValley Gas Co. supra the court held that one who so
negligently drills a well that salt water is allowed to enter subterranean
streams of fresh water, is liable for injury to fresh water springs and
wells on adjacent land. It is a close analogy that one who should so
negligently drill a well as to allow salt water to enter subterranean
pools of oil, should be liable for injury to oil wells on adjacent land.
In the principal case no mention was made of a common law
remedy. The remedy there was based entirely upon statutes. Kentucky Statutes. section 466, provide that one injured by another's violation of a statute may recover from the offender such damages as he
has sustained. Construed in connection with section 3914a Kentucky
Statutes, it gives a remedy by way of damages, unless the remedies
therein mentioned are exclusive. That these statutes should be construed together see State v. Ensley. 97 N. E. 113. 177 Ind. 483; Commonwealth v. International Harvester Co., 115 S. W. 703. 131 Ky. 551:
American Tobacco Co. v. Commonwealth, 115 S. W. 755; Douglas v.
Edwards, 298 F. 229. In holding that the statutory remedy is not exclusive, the court in the principal case was following the general rule.
Southern Railway Co. v. Moore, 133 Ga. 806, 67 S. B. 85; R. M. At kinson v. Virginia Oil & Gas Co.. supra.
B. D

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ON EXPIRATION OF PROSECUTING ATTopnEY's TERm AFTER CHANGE FROm THIRD TO SECOND CLASS CITY. IT WAS
CITY;S DUTY TO ELECT SUCCESSOR TO SERVE UNTIL END OF YEAR FOR ELECTION OF CITY ATTORNEY, AND ONE ELECTED AND APPOINTED BY MAYOR WAS
ENTITLED TO OFFICE AS AGAINST PREDEESsOR.-The appellant was duly
elected prosecuting attorney of the city of Ashland in 1921. for a term
of four years, as provided by law. Ashland was a city of the third class
at that time, but in 1924 it was advanced to second class by an act
which provides, "That all officers now holding offices in any of the cities
changed from a class other than they were at the time such officers
were elected will hold their offices until the term for which they were
elected has expired, and until their successors have been elected and
qualified." Appellant's term expired in 1925.
Section 3172 of the
Kentucky Statutes. which is also a part of the charter of cities of the
second class, provides that, "At the regular election. 1895, and every
four years thereafter, there shall be elected by the qualified voters of the
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city, a mayor, city clerk, city treasurer, city attorney, city solicitor, if
there be such officer, and a civil engineer and assessor and city jailer,
who shall hold office for a period of four years and until their successors are elected and qualified." By virtue of this statute the regular
election for city attorney in second class cities would have taken place
in November, 1923, while the election of a prosecuting attorney in a
city of the third class took place in November. 1925. The city council
of Ashland in 1924 passed an ordinance providing for the election of a
city attorney and other officials at the election in November. 1925. The
appellee was in the meantime nominated for this office and was duly
elected at the November election. The appellant contends that. inasmuch as he was elected under the constitutional and statutory provisions for a term of four years, and until his successor is elected and
qualifies, his term does not terminate until his successor has been
elected at a regular election and qualified as then provided for by section 3172, Kentucky Statutes, and that the election is void because
there was no constitutional or statutory authority for the election of a
city attorney of second class cities at the November election, 1925.
After the election of appellee. and to be assured, the mayor of Ashland
appointed the appellee city attorney, in case a vacancy should be found
to exist as a result of the litigation. And it is also claimed by the appellant that the mayor had no power to make this appointment as there
'was no vacancy in thb office. Held. that inasmuch as the appellant's
term of office expired at the end of 1925, and as this was not the regular year in which to elect a city attorney in second class cities, and there
would occur a vacancy unless filled by election or appointment, it was
the duty of the city to cause an election to be held to fill out the unexpired term, ending with the year 1927, and had there been no election
the mayor, being the chief executive officer of the city, was empowered
by statute (sections 3049 and 3108) to fill the vacancy, and had full
power and authority to do so. Fullerton v. Mann, 214 Ky. 764, 284 S.
W. 113.
In Stevens v. Carter, 40 Pac. 1074. 27 Or. 553, the court in discussing this question said: "The rule is well settled that the right of an
officer to hold over until after the expiration of the term exists only in
case there is no regularly elected and qualified successor, and the incumb-nt can not continue in offIlce after the expiration of his term if
his successor has been chosen and is qualified, for when the rights of
a successor vest, those of the incumbent terminate."
In the case of Wilson v. Johnson, 95 Ky. 415. the successcr o£ the
old officer was in fact elected at the November electicn. 1893, aipd the
old officer was not entitled to hold thereafter. In answar to his coutention that he might so hold over. this court said: "It is true he wvej to
hold until the general election in November, 1893, and until his successor was elected and qualified, but this is the usual method provided
to prevent a vacancy, when from some unforeseen circumstance no election has been held at the regular time, or some time elapse until the
succeeding officer shall qualify and be inducted into office." As said
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in Stevens v. Wyatt, 16 B. Monroe 542: "Such continuation was manifestly designed to obviate any inconveniences that might attend vacancies occurring between the expiration of the term of the incumbent
and the qualification of his successor." This rule was also followed in
Lafferty v. Htffman, 99 Ky. 95, 35 S. W. 123, and in Olmstead v. Augustus, 112 Ky. 366, 65 S. W. 817.
The court in rendering this decision has clearly followed the rule
that prevails in this state as well as in other jurisdictions.
M.W .M.
MUNIcIPAL CORPORATIONS-AcTION CANNOT BE MAINTAINED BY A TAXPAYER TO ENJOIN PAYMENT OF SALARY TO CITY MARSHAL O, GROUND
THAT HE is INELIGIBLE, SINcE STATUTE AFFORDS ADEQUATE REMEDY AT

LAw.--Defendant had been appointed city marshal of a city of the
fifth class by the city council according to law. At the time of the
appointment he was neither a resident nor an elector of the city. Plaintiff, a citizen and taxpayer, brought this action to enjoin payment of
defendant's salary on the ground that defendant was ineligible under
section 3625 of the Kentucky Statutes, which provided that the marshal
must be a resident of the city at the time of appointment. Held, that
such action, being in its nature equitable, could not be maintained, since
there was an adequate remedy at law. Spurlock v. Lafferty, 214 Ky.
333, 283 S. W. 124.
It is a fundamental principle of equity that relief by injunction
will not be granted where there is an adequate remedy at law. The
adequate remedy at law is found in the provisions of the Kentucky
Civil Code, sections 480 to 485. Section 483 provides: "If any person
usurp an office or a franchise, the person entitled thereto, or the Commonwealth, may prevent the usurpation by an ordinary action." Section 484 says, "It shall be the duty of the several Commonwealth attorneys to institute the actions mentioned in this chapter against
usurpation of county offices or franchises, if no other be entitled
thereto, or if the person entitled fail to institute the same during three
months after usurpation." Although this relief at law was not available to the plaintiff, yet it could be brought by one who represented
him as well as the rest of the public, and hence afforded an adequate
remedy at law.
There is no authority on this exact question to be found in the
decisions of the Kentucky courts, but abundant authority may be
loc't-d' elsewhere. In a New York case it was sought to enjoin the
pa.me~it of salaries of police officers whose appointment was valid in
'form but. elaimed to be invalid in fact. The court said that the injunctive relief asked for involved the question of title to office and would
not be granted, as the proper proceeding was by quo warranto. Greene
v. Knox, 175 N. Y. 432, 67 N. E. 910.
A similar case was before the Delaware court. The court said,
quoting from the opinion, "Equity will not entertain a bill to restrain
the payment to him of the salary, because to do so would involve a.
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determination of the question of his right and title to the office, a
question which can be conveniently and adequately remedied at law."
Ake v. Boolckhammer, 13 Del. Ch. 320, 119 A. 238. The Supreme Court
of Illinois reached a like result. 264 Ill. 563, 106 N. E. 488.
Courts of equity have been uniform in taking this view. Colton v.
State, 50 Ala. 424; Lawrence v. Leidigh, 58 Kan. 676, 50 Pac. 889;
Burgess v. Davis, 138 Ill. 578, 28 N. E. 817.
Some Kentucky cases support the quoted sections of the Code
and stand for the general proposition that a private citizen and taxpayer has no right to maintain an action to oust a usurper from office.
Wilson v. Tye, 126 Ky. 84, 31 Ky. Law Rep. 491, 102 S. W. 856; Amburson v. Fowler, 180 Ky. 587, 203 S. W. 322.
The Kentucky court in the principal case followed the rule laid
down by the various state courts and seems to be clearly correct in its
R. R. R.
decision.
TAXATIoN-FRFIGHT CA.s ON FOREIGN RATLROADS, USED TO CARRY
FREIGHT ON CONNECTING CARimEs LINE ron SHmPxa's CONVENIENCE,
HELD NOT SUBJECT TO TAXATIoN W1Tia STATE NOT HAVING ACQUIRED

TAxAmLE SzTus-Defendant railroad company, located outside the
state, let or hired cars to railroads within the state under agreement
commonly called "per diem freight car arrangement."
These cars
were used for the purpose of carrying freight on other lines for the
convenience of the shipper. The plaintiff brought this action for a
tax on such cars. Held, that these cars were here temporarily, for the
convenience of the shipper and did not have a situs for taxation within
the state. Commonwealth v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 214 Ky. 339,
283 S. W. 119.
Rolling stock, being personal property, is usually considered as
having a situs for taxation at the home of the owner. In order that
personal property may have a situs for taxation in a locality different
from the domicile of its owner, such personal property must be permanently located at the place where it is sought to be taxed. No temporary location will alter its situs for taxation at a place other than
the residence of its owner. Semple v. Commonwealth, 181 Ky. 675, 205
S. W. 789. This proposition is supported by Tamble v. Pullman Car Co.,
207 Fed. 30, 124 C. C. A. 590.
Railroad cars and rolling stock have a situs for taxation in a
state foreign to the domicile of the owner if doing regular business
in that state. Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Lynch, 18 Utah 378,
55 Pac. 639, 48 L. R. A. 790. Affirmed by the U. S. Supreme Court in
177 U. S. 149.
But the principal case is not one of a foreign corporation regularly doing business in this state. This foreign corporation is merely
hirIng cars to roads in this state, not for profit, but for the connvenlence of the shippers. Tie statement of Justice Holmes in New
York Central Railroad v. Miller, 26 S. Ct. 714, 202 U. S. 584, 50 L. Ed.
1155, is applicable here. Quoting, "These foreign cars come .into the
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state on random excursions of casually chosen cars, determined by
the varying orders of particular shippers and the arbitrary convenience of the other roads." No business, no purpose of the owning road
is served by their presence here. They are only chattels temporarily
present within the state, which such chattels this state may not tax
and which its Constitution and statutes when correctly construed as
applying only to property having a taxable situs in this state do not require us to tax.
The decision of the court in the principal case is in accord with
the general rule and seems to be correct both on principle and reason.

R. R. R.
OrFcFais-CHiEr CLERIK OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES NOT WiTrN

DuRING TERm AND HENCE
ACT INCREASING SALARY NOT INvALID.-At the 1926 session of the GenPROHIBiTioN AGAINST CHANGE OF .SALARY

eral Assembly a statute was enacted by which the salary of the chief
clerk of the House of Representatives was increased from eight dollars
per day to twenty-six dollars per day. The increase was to take effect
from the beginning of the session. Upon demand of the clerk the
auditor refused to draw in his favor a warrant upon the treasurer for
the amount of the increased salary. An action was brought to compel the auditor to issue the warrant. The validity of the act raising
the clerk's salary was challenged. Held, the clerk is a public officer,
but as his term was not fixed by law, he is subject to dismissal by the
appointing power at any time, and does not come within the statute
prohibiting change of salary during term of office. Shanks, Auditor v.
Howes, Chief Clerk, 214 Ky. 613, 283 S. W. 966.
Section 1988 of the Kentucky Statutes provides, "At the beginning
of each regular session of the General Assembly, each House thereof
shall elect one chief clerk....
" His term is not set forth. The
proposition that Tie is therefore subject to dismissal at any time is
supported by Parsonsv. Breed, 126 Ky. 759, 104 S. W. 766, which holds
that a public officer whose term is not prescribed by law, holds at the
-ill of the appointing power and has no fixed term.
Leading cases of other states on the main point involved herein
uphold the rule that officers who have no fixed term, but retain office
at the will of the appointing power, are subject to have their compensation changed during the time they are in office.
Muskogee County v.
Hart, 29 Okla. 693, 119 Pac. 132. This principle is laid down in Gibbs
v. Morgan, 39 N. J. Eq. (12 Stew.) 126, as follows: "A deputy county
clerk who holds his office at the pleasure of the county clerk has no
'term' of office within the constitutional prohibition of special laws
creating, increasing or decreasing the allowance of public officers
during the 'term' for which they were elected or appointed." The
same principle is followed in Commonwealth v. Ewald Iron Co., 153 Ky.
196, 154 S. W. 931, where the court said, a statute relative to change
of officets' compensation during term of office does not appl Co reve-
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nue agents appointed under the Kentucky Statutes, section 4258, and removable by the Auditor of Public Accounts at pleasure.
The decision that the clerk of the house does not come within the
statute prohibiting change of salary of officer during term is further
substantiated by Temple v. Corbell, 17 Ariz. 1, 147 Pac.. 747; Pueblo
Co. v: Smith, 22 Cal. 534, 45 Pac. 357, where it is held that public
officers whose term is not fixed by law retain office at the will of the
E. C. M.
appointing power.

SALEs-ouRTs OF KENTuCKY WILL RECOGNIZE AND ENFORCE CONDITIONAL SALE CONTRACTS

MADE IN

STATES WHERE SUCH CONTRACTS ARE

UPUELD.-Plaintiff sold an automabile in the state of Kansas under
a conditional sale contract, reserving title in himself until all the deferred payments should be made. The vendee of that transaction executed a note secured by mortgage which recited the terms of sale-the,
reservation of title in the vendor. The vendees then became financially
involved and employed the defendant, a citizen of Kentucky, to audit
their business. The note and mortgage were included in the records
audited by the defendant. Defendant later, in Chicago, accepted the
automobile as part payment for the services which he rendered the
vendees. The plaintiff then brought this action in Kentucky to recover
the automobile. Held, the vendor of a conditional sale contract made
in the state of Kansas retained title until the deferred payments were
made. Kelley v. Brackc, 214 Ky. 9, 282 S. W. 190.
The court on appeal said: "While we regard all contracts of conditional sale made in Kentucky as chattel mortgages, Wender Blue Gem
Coal 0o. V. The Louisville Property Co., 137 Ky. 339, 125 S. W. 732;
Baldwin & Co. v. Crow, etc., 86 Ky. 679, 7 S. W. 146, 9 Ky. Law Rep.
816; Tucker v. Witherbee, 130 Ky. 269, 113 S. W. 123; Furwiler v.
Roberts, 26 Ky. Law Rep. 297, 80 S. W. 1148, we, under comity of states,
recognize and enforce such contracts as valid when made in states
the laws of which sanction and uphold agreements by which a vendor
retains title in the property until the full purchase price is paid. Fry
Bros. v. Theobold, 205 Ky. 146, 265 S. W. 498; Tennessee Auto Corporation v. Bank, 205 Ky. 541, 266 S. W. 54."
One of the earliest cases to be decided in Kentucky which construed conditional sale contracts as passing title to the vendee with
a mortgage back to the vendor was that of Prather v. Norfleet,, 1 A.
K. Marshall 178. By the contract, which was the subject of this litigation, a negro slave was sold upon the condition that he should be
returned by a certain time if the deferred payment was not made upon
its due date. The negro died after the date of payment but before
the payment was made, however. The court decided that the vendee
should bear the burden of the loss of property sold in a conditional
sale, even though by its terms title had not passed. The court affirmed
this decision In the case of Wender Blue Gem Coal Co. v. Louisville
Prcpc.Zj Co., 137 Ky. 339, 125 S. W. 732, and stated that "while con-
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tracts by which property is sold, and it is stipulated that title will remain in the vendor until the purchase price is paid, are enforced in
some states, the rule in Kentucky has long been that such contracts
are mortgages, and are not valid against purchasers for value, or creditors unless recorded. Greer v. Church, 13 Bush 430." The rule was
followed in The Montenegro-Riehms Music Co. v. Beuris, 160 Ky. 557,
169 S. W. 986; and recognized in Fry Brothers v. Theobold, 205 Ky.
146, 265 S. W. 498, and the principal case.
The court in the principal case under the principle of comity construed the terms of the contract by the law of the state where the
contract was made. Since it would be enforced in that state, the court
rightly found for the plaintiff.
C. P. R.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER--PURCHASER MAY REcovER DEFIcIENoY IN
ACREAGE WHERE IT IS GREATER THAN TEN PER CENT OF GRoss, IF THE
PARTIES DID NOT INTEND TO RISK MORE THAN USUAL RATE or DEFICT.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER-PURCHASER COULD NOT REcOvER FOR DEFICIENCY WHERE LAND WAs DESCRIBED AS CONTAINING 138 ACRES "MORE
OF LESS" As LAND WAS SoirD BY BOUNDARY' AND NOT By THE Acav-Appellee sold and conveyed to appellant a tract of land. The written
contract of sale and the deed executed to effectuate the deal, In connection with the description of the land, contained the following words:
"containing 138 acres, be the same more or less, as said land is sold
by the boundary and not by the acre." Four years after the deed was
made a survey of the land was made and the acreage found to be less
than the amount named in the deed. This action was to recover for
the shortage.
The court held that the parties intended to risk the contingency
of quantity, whatever it might be, or how muchsoever it migbt exceed
or fall short of that mentioned in the contract. If the circumstances
were such as to show that the parties did not intend to risk more than
the usual rate of deficit, then the appellant could recover if the deficit
was more than ten per cent of gross. Sheets v. McDonald, 281 S. W.
536, 213 Ky. 595.
The same conclusion was reached in Sanders v. Lindsey, 263 S. W.
713, 204 Ky. 57. The contract and deed contained the words "more or
less" and the vendor suffered the loss of forty-five acres. But in the
absence of the clause of risk, if from the circumstances of the parties,
and the value, location and condition of the property it appears that the
representations as to acreage were relied on by the purchaser, the purchaser may recover for the deficiency, that is, if the deficiency is more
than ten per cent of the gross. The sale can be by gross or by boundary.
Salyer v. Blessing, 152 S. W. 275, 151 Ky. 459. See also Lassiter v.
Farris,259 S. W. 696, 202 Ky. 330; Engemann v. Allen, 257 S. W. 25,
201 Ky. 483.
As to the question of fraud there are two interesting cases. In
Crampton v. Prince, 83 Ala. 246, 3 So. 519, it was held that a purchaser cannot claim abatement of the purchase money, because the
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lot is a few feet less in depth than stated in the deed, when it appears
that the property was sold at a gross price, and not by the foot, that no
representations as to the quantity or area were made and that the
boundaries were well known, definitely marked, and correctly described.
This case seems to hint that if there had been misrepresentations the
conclusion would -have been different. Then, in a late case in Georgia.
it was held that where both parties have equal opportunity to judge
for themselves and both act in good faith, deficiency in quantity of
land sold by tract where land was described as so many acres more
or less, does not apply where purchaser relied on seller's representations, amounting to actual fraud and known by seller to be false (126
S. E. 877, 33 Ga. Appeals 509).
J. S. F.
WLs-HoLoGRAPHIC
TESTING WrTNESS WHO IS

WILL MAY Bi
A DL IsS,

PROBATED ON

EvIDENcE OF AT-

WrTHouT DESTROYING DEvis.-

Testator separated from his wife and went west where he married the
appellee. He continued to live with her until his death. This action
was brought to obtain a judgment invalidating the devise to appellee,
on the ground that she, an attesting witness to the will, and the only
person by whom its execution could be proven, was called and testified
as a witness at the probate proceedings, contrary to Kentucky Statutes,
section 4836. As it was not averred that the will was not written in the
hand of the testator, the court held that if the paper was wholly holographic it could be probated upon the evidence of an attesting witness, who Is devisee, without destroying the devise, and that section
4836, Kentucky Statutes, does not apply. Cromwell, et at. v. gtevens.
et al., 212 Ky. 209, 278 S. W. 555.
That the statute in question did not apply to holographic wills
was ably stated in Harl v. Vairin, 175 Ky. 468, 194 S. W. 546. Generally attestation to a holographic will is not necessary to give it validity. In Baiker v. Dobyns, 34 Ky. (4 Dana) 220, it was held that a will
wholly written and signed by the testator is valid without any subscribing witnesses. See also Morris v. Morton, Exrs., 14 K. L. R. 563,
20 S. W. 287. Then it follows that the devise to an attesting Witness
Is not rendered invalid by his giving evidence in support of probation,
where the will could have been probated without his evidence (Calvert,
et al. v. Calvert, et at., 208 Ky. 760, 271 S. W. 1082). Another interesting
Kentucky case is Mercer's Administrator v. Macklin, 77 Ky. (14 Bush)
434. There it was held that the devisees under an alleged holographic
will were competent witnesses to prove the execution of the will. This
latter case seems to come to the same conclusion as the principal case.
However, the fact that the will has been attested by subscribing
witnesses does not render the will one that is not holographic. In
Toebbe v. Williams, 80 Ky. 661, it was held that as a rule a holographic
will need not be witnessed, yet a writing may be proved as a holographic will, though attested by subscribing witnesses. An instrument
may be established as a holographic will notwithstanding the fact that
it has upon it an unsigned testation clause.
J. S. F.
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WILLS-GRANDDAUGHTERS,

DEVISED FUTURE ABSOLUTE FEE IN

OF FARM OF OTHER, SHOULD THAT OTHER DIE WITHOUT LEAVING
HELD TO TAKE
DAUGHTER,

"EXECUTORY

DEVISE"

OR

"SHIFTING USE,"

AND

DEVISED FEE ON DEAH OF LIFE TENANT, UNLESS

WITHOUT ISSUE, TAXES A DEFEASiBLE

HaL'
ISSUE
GRAND-

SHE DIE

,EMAINDER FEE.-This is an action

brought by the plaintiff to compel the defendant to specifically perform
a written cofitract for the sale of a tract of land. Together with the
warranty deed, executed by the plaintiffs and their husbands, there was
filed a copy of the last will and testament of the grandfather of the
plaintiffs. By clauses one and two of this will, each of the plaintiffs
took only a defeasible fee in the respective halves of the farm, since
each of them was devised the future absolute fee in the half of the
other, should that other die without leaving living issue. By construction of the will the court held that the plaintiffs had a perfect title
to the land deeded to the defendant, therefore he must specifically perform his contract. McWilliams v. Haverly, 214 Ky. 320, 283 S. W. 103.
The plaintiffs' respective future interests in the halves of the other
was not, therefore, a technical common law remainder interest, but was
an estate created by what the law has designated as an "executory
devise," or "shifting use," by means of which a future fee could be
created in derogation of a prior defeasible one in the first taker.
Mr. Bouvier, in his definition of the term "executory devise," says
that it is "such a limitation of a future estate in land or chattels as
the law admits in case of a will, though contrary to the rules of limitation in conveyances at common law," It is a limitation by will of a
future estate or interests in lands or chattels. In re Brown's Estate,
38 Pa. 294.
The difference between a common law remainder, which must be
supported by a prior particular estate, and a future interest taking
effect as a fee in derogation of a defeasible fee devised or conveyed to
the first taker, is, when the latter character of a future interest is
created by a will, known in the law as an "executory devise" and
when it is created by a deed it is commonly designated as a "conditional limitation," and in either eVent is given effect as a "shifting or
springing use."
"A definite failure of issue is where a precise time is fixed for the
failure of an issue, not in express terms, but inferrable with reference
to aiiy particular time or event, as in the case of a devise to a designated person, but, if he die without lawful issue living at the time of
his death; then over." Diehl v. King, 6 Serg. R. (Pa.) 29, 9 Am. Dec.
407; Downing v. -Wherrin,19 N. H. 9, 49 Am. Dec. 139. The failure of
issue in the case at hand, upon which the future springing uses and
estates created by testator's will in the two female plaintiffs took effect.
is and was a definite failure of issue under the definitions, supra.
In the cases 'of Murphy v. Murphy, 207 S. W. 491, 182 Ky. 731:
Fulton v. Fulton, 209 S. W. 535, 183 Ky. 385; Barret v. Percival, 246
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S. W. 143, 197 KY. 88, and Rwering v. Ewering, 251 S. W. 645, 199 KY.
450, this court has upheld future estates limited after the defeat of a
defeasible fee in the first taker.
This doctrine is supported by the best authorities.
M. W. M.
WILLS-DEVISING PROPERTY TO DAUGHTERS FR LIFE, AND ON DEATH1
OF SURVivoRa wT REMAINDER OVER, HELD TO CLEARLY REBUT PRESUMPTION OF CROSS REMAINDER ron LIFE OF Sunvivo.-Testatrix devised land
to her two daughters subject to the following conditions: That it be
managed by the two daughters, and that the rents and profits be equally
divided between the two, but that it should not be sold until the death
of both the daughters, at which time there should be a remainder in
the grandchildren of testatrix. It was further provided that upon the
death of one of the daughters, her place in the management of the estate should be supplied by one of her children. Held, that there was
not a cross remainder for life of the survivor, but a devise to each of
the daughters for the life of the other. The estate of the deceased
daughter was in nature of an estate pur autre vie, which, under Kentucky Statutes, section 3861, went to her personal representative as personal property. Anderson v. Simpson, 214 Ky. 375, 283 S. W. 941.
When a particular estate is granted to several persons in common,
and upon determination of the interest of either of them, his share is
to go in remainder to the rest, the remainders so limited over are said
to be cross remainders. 4 Kent. Comm., p. 201; Houghton v. Brantingham, 86 Conn. 630. It was very early stated in England that a gift
of land to A and B for life as tenants in common, with remainder over
upon the death of all the co-tenants, raises by implication a cross-remainder in the survivor. Ashley v. Ashley, 6 Sim. 358; Pearce v. Edneades, 3 You. & Coll. 246; Jarmon on Wills, second American edition,
p. 341. The reason for the rule as stated is that the law avoids the splitting of tenures. Marryattv. Townly, 1 Ves. 102, 27 Reprint 918.
In the case of Kramer v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 293 Ill. 553,
127 N. E. 877, where the testator, after devising real property to his
children with provision that, "at the death of all my children," said
property should go to his grandchildren, it was held that cross-remainders were raised by implication among the children of testator.
The courts of New York and Massachusetts have rendered like decisions. Hadcox v. Cody, 213 N. Y. 570, 108 N. E. 84; Vandengurgh v.
Vandengurgh, 147 N. Y. Sup. 244, 85 Misc. R. 131; Loring v. Coolidge
and others, 99 Mass. 191. In the case of Addicks v. Addicks, 266 Ill.
349, 107 N. E. 580, it was pointed out that the rule did not apply unless
it was clear that the remaindermen should not tak until the death of
all the co-tenants. In the case of Fenters v. Holmes, 5 Ky. Op. 22, the
court held that i devise to A and B "and their children" gave to A and
B life estates, and, upon the death of A, that title to his share vested in
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his children, there being no cross-remainder to B by implication. See
also Eskridge v. Deweese, 180 Ky. 488, 203 S. W. 197. It will be noted
that in these Kentucky cases there is no clear intention that the remaindermen should not take until the death of all the life tenants.
No Kentucky case has been found where a cross remainder has
been raised by implication. Nor has any case been found directly
contra to the Kramer case, supra, where it Is stated that cross remainders are raised by implication in order to carry out the intention of the
testator. The intention of the testator must govern. Moore v. Moore,
12 B. Mon. 686; Darnel v. Crain's Gu.a.rdian, 1. Ky. L. Rep. 354.
In the present case the provision that upon the death of one of the
testator's children her place in the management of the estate should
be supplied by one of her children (the testator's grandchild) indicates that the intention of the testator was that cross remalnderg
should not be raised in the surviving life tenant. For if the survivor was
to take all it would not have been directed that another should share
in the management.
B. D.

